Introduction
UK policy for development of low carbon and renewable energy has largely relied on a technology-driven, supply-side model of innovation (Steward, 2012) . It is however increasingly recognised that transformation of energy systems also requires innovation in societal institutions and among energy users (Coutard and Rutherford, 2010; Geels 2010; Mitchell, 2008) . A key setting for such socio-technical innovation is likely to be the urban and regional scale, where economy, ecology and politics intersect in the intensive end-use of energy in public, commercial and domestic sectors (Hodson and Marvin, 2012; Monstadt, 2007) .
At urban scale, energy scenario analyses suggest that district heating (and cooling 1 ) networks could solve the problem of sustainable heat (and cooling) supply to densely populated areas and hence could form important components of integrated low carbon energy systems. Heat networks exploit the synergies between electricity, heating and transport services to achieve higher efficiency and greater deployment of renewable resources (IEA 2014) . Heat networks can use any locally available fuel, including heat recovered from primary sources which would otherwise be wasted, and which are difficult to use at individual building scale. Cogeneration of heat and electricity can reduce electricity network losses and defer, or reduce, costs of capacity upgrades in distribution networks (Kelly and Pollitt, 2010) . Heat networks can also contribute to system balancing by generating heat locally and by thermal storage of excess electricity generation, reducing the need for investment in fossil-fuel 'stand by' plant and reducing costs of transmission network reinforcement (Lehtonen and Nye 2009; UK Low Carbon Innovation Coordination Group, 2012) . Securing the systemic benefits of sustainability and flexibility in integration of alternative heat sources, however, is dependent on use of integrated networks operating across urban areas, rather than fragmented or small scale developments (IEA 2005) .
Establishing such district energy infrastructure can be understood as a form of sociotechnical innovation to assemble the long-term, stable coordination of interdependencies between heat suppliers, investors, network operators and heat users in a particular locality (Summerton, 1992) . There is however limited knowledge about the political and economic governance institutions most likely to facilitate such developments in liberalised energy markets, when provision has historically been limited. The development of extensive district energy systems in Denmark and Sweden occurred prior to energy liberalisation across Europe, and was planned and organised by local governments, mandated by states; local authorities exercised considerable control over the relationships between energy systems, infrastructure finance and heat use (Rutherford 2008 , Ericson 2009 , Grohnheit and Gram Mortensen 2003 . Municipal ownership of both electricity and district heating undertakings was the norm; municipal house building programmes created significant heat load to secure network efficiencies and the combined welfare, economic development and environmental protection responsibilities of local government created scope to cross-subsidise development with other municipal services.
This paper contributes to evidence about heat network development in contemporary conditions characterised by liberalised energy markets and diminished local government control over direct service and welfare provision. This allows us to move beyond anachronistic accounts, which emphasise the difference between development in state-planned vs liberalised energy sectors. Our principle focus is on the UK and our key question is why recent UK heat network developments remain small scale, fragmented and hence technically sub-optimal, in comparison with those in relatively similar European countries (Wiltshire, et al 2013 Government 2014); third all were early in liberalisation of energy; fourth they display homogeneity in the energy source underpinning heating services (gas in the UK and Netherlands, electricity in Norway). The key difference between them however is that they appear to have differential capacities for new development of urban-scale heat networks, with Netherlands and Norway being more advanced than the UK. The comparison is expected to provide insight into the factors which differentiate between them. Specifically we examine the conjecture that the contrasting political and economic institutions of liberal and coordinated market economies (Hall and Soskice, 2001 ) result in differential forms of energy market liberalisation, which are associated with different capacities for district heating (DH) development. The UK represents an example of a liberal market economy (LME) and the Netherlands and Norway are examples of coordinated market economies (CMEs).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. First we discuss the interrelations between the knowledge and resources needed for district energy development and the governance institutions which shape liberalised energy markets in these three European states. Second we introduce case studies of five district energy developments. Since our primary focus is on the UK, we examine three UK examples of small projects in Aberdeen, Birmingham and Woking and compare these with developments in Rotterdam, Netherlands and Bergen, Norway. Lastly we discuss findings and draw conclusions about lessons for the UK in implementation of policy for low carbon heat.
Inter-Relations of District Energy and Political and Economic Governance in Liberalised Energy Markets
Securing the sustainability benefits of district energy relies on establishing long-term interdependencies between locally-embedded actors and resources, and nonembedded financial and technical expertise (Summerton, 1992) . Project development hence entails coordination and translation between technical-economic logics of infrastructure cost and risk mitigation, and goals of durable social and environmental benefits in relation to multiple organisational interests. Relative to other energy networks, DH infrastructure has high sunk (fixed) costs, justified by the exploitation of low cost heat sources (low variable costs) over the long term (networks are expected to last for up to 50 years). Its economic viability is hence dependent on longterm user commitments to take heat supply from the local monopoly network; potential for price competition operates between heat providers to the network at area, rather than building, level. Summerton (1992) emphasises these features in her characterisation of DH systems as "grid-based multi-organisations" (GBMOs) with multiple interdependencies between heat generators, network operator, users and investors. As noted above, where heat networks are a significant part of national energy systems, local and regional governments have historically played a critical coordinating role in the assembly of local GBMOs. Under these conditions, and supported by national government policies and programmes, local authorities in several European countries planned for spatially optimised heat network development in coordination with other utility systems, managed risks associated with a monopoly heat supplier and represented long-term public interests (Ericson, 2009; Grohnheit and Gram Mortensen 2003; Rutherford 2008 ).
The contemporary institutional framework for DH development is very different.
European political decisions to liberalise energy provision have prioritised forms of market competition, which are regarded as securing short term cost efficiencies.
Commercial goals are achieved by disaggregating transmission and distribution from generation and retail, and the introduction of competition in wholesale and retail markets (Mitchell, 2008) ; social obligations are limited and policies are oriented to profitable returns on private capital (Rutherford, 2008; Sundberg and Sjodin, 2003) .
Energy liberalisation is part of the broader shift 'from government to governance' observed in many countries whereby activities and responsibilities which were the preserve of governments have been increasingly contracted out to an array of public, private and civil society organisations. This shift is both multi-dimensional and differentially enacted across countries (Lange et al. 2013 ), but in relation to localised energy, it has been associated with decline in capacity to effect coordinated planning and increased fragmentation in services (Bulkeley and Kern, 2006; Rutherford 2008; Monstadt 2007 ).
The differential scale of new DH developments in the Netherlands, Norway and UK however suggest that the political and economic institutions of energy market liberalisation vary between countries, resulting in different opportunities or patterns of support for localised low carbon infrastructure. Comparative studies of capitalism in affluent economies notably distinguish between ideal types of liberal and coordinated market economies (Hall and Soskice, 2001) . These two models are characterised by contrasting institutional and cultural frameworks which condition the interactions between state, market and civil society organisations, resulting in enduring differences in levels of social protection, business strategies, forms of innovation, terms of access to finance and availability of collective goods. In LMEs, businesses (and UK local governments) are incentivised to coordinate activities via market contracts, competition and price signals. In CMEs, there is greater dependence on strategic coordination and deliberative problem-solving via information sharing in non-market and cross-sectoral networks. Differences in political and economic institutions, enacted through formal organisations, build different strategic understandings, through repeated experience, about how interested parties will act in relation to changes in economic context. Although in reality there are considerable overlaps between practices in different capitalist economies, as well as competitive pressures towards institutional convergence, evidence suggests that the institutional distinctiveness of LMEs and CMEs has not disappeared: economic and political organisations in CMEs have adapted to market principles, while the legitimacy of stakeholder capitalism and shared economic citizenship has persisted (Ingham, 2011) .
In addition the political and economic institutions characteristic of CMEs are argued to result in greater capacity for sustainable energy development than those of LMEs, because they create the necessary social infrastructure for cross-sectoral planning and deliberative problem-solving which is discouraged on grounds of inefficiency in LMEs (Mikler and Harrison, 2012) . We identify two features of CMEs as likely to be advantageous in relation to new district energy development in liberalised energy systems. First, the political and economic institutions of CMEs are more likely to enable inter-firm collaboration over long-term trust-based relationships than LMEs; notably CME governance institutions are more likely to promote information sharing and reputational monitoring and to discipline non-cooperation. Second, CME governance institutions are likely to have greater capacity to shape market formation to secure urban DH economies of scope and scale. DH systems have an intensive capital investment phase during the period of network construction. This creates risks of stranded assets if the capacity to bring new subscribers onto the system is uncertain.
National and local governments have scope to shape this process through planning policies, heat network operator regulation and area-wide concessions. The extent to which such policies are adopted, and are regarded by firms as credibly robust, influences the willingness of companies to invest. Neo-corporatist practices, and decentralised policy-making allowing multiple points of access and veto, are more prevalent in CMEs than LMEs, and are associated with establishing the long-term credibility of coordinating policies (Hall and Soskice, 2001) . Survey data from 2,500 local authorities in 14 OECD countries also suggest that equivalent contrasts in capacities for cross-sector coordination operate at local scale (Navarro Yáñez et al., 2008) . In countries where local government has both a high degree of responsibility for service delivery and a high degree of financial autonomy, as in Northern European CMEs (Sellers and Kwak 2011) , coordinated action is more common, and becomes increasingly common the more central government interacts with local decision making.
These theoretical observations lead to expected differences between outcomes for district energy developments in Norway and the Netherlands, commonly categorised as CMEs, and the UK, as an archetypal LME. Norwegian local authorities work under state supervision of expenditure, and are governed by principles of economic redistribution, but they exercise considerable direct control over revenues and their autonomy is treated as critical to effectiveness (Sellers and Kwak, 2011) . Local taxes account for 44% of income, with an additional 14% from fees, and they remain significant stakeholders in enterprises including energy (Norwegian Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development, 2013) . Although financial centralisation is strong in Netherlands' government, municipalities own stakes in regional energy enterprises (OECD 2013), and local political leaders have considerable discretion over budget allocation and play prominent roles in state and European politics. In contrast UK local government is constrained by statutory duties prescribed by central governments, and is principally dependent on central government grant funding rather than local taxation (Sellers and Kwak 2011) ; moreover it has no direct mandate in relation to localised energy provision. It is expected therefore that multi-organisation collaboration for district energy will be more feasible, and the role of the state in forming local DH markets more supportive, in the Netherlands and Norway than the UK.
Governance of Urban Energy Development in Europe: Netherlands, Norway and UK Case Studies
Case study data are derived principally from 15 semi-structured interviews with project developers, local government and state policy documents, and framework contracts and evaluations. The analysis draws on a larger dataset of 114 semistructured interviews with district energy project teams, policy-makers, finance, legal and engineering experts and representatives of large scale utilities, as well as four one day workshops with UK local authorities active in district energy developments.
Interviews typically lasted for around one and a half to two hours. These brief accounts of projects inevitably gloss over the nuances of the process, which in each case was marked by forms of dissent, uncertainty and changes of direction. As in Bergen, the origins of the Rotterdam initiative lie in business engagement with regulatory issues concerning waste heat. In the 1990s, harbour industries were collaborating in industrial ecology programmes, with the objective of reframing environmental damage as a joint problem over which industry could exert more influence, rather than as a site of antagonism between industry, regulators, regional and state government and environmental movements (Baas, 2008; Baas and Korevaar, 2010) . Plant managers shared data for feasibility studies for heat recovery and use, and plans coalesced around DH supply to Rotterdam city regeneration districts as more achievable than inter-industry heat supply.
Rotterdam city municipality was not a central participant in the industrial ecology programme, but the harbour company is itself a municipal business. As climate politics gained prominence in the early 2000s, the Mayor of Rotterdam joined the C40 Cities climate leadership group on the basis of a claim to environmental sustainability innovator status. The city's political leaders adopted an active role in sustainability initiatives, including industrial heat recovery, in partnership with businesses. The consequences of municipal involvement are contested, with some claims that trust between industrial ecology programme participants was undermined, that there were political mistakes and that new market procurement procedures, requiring competitive tendering and contractualisation, slowed development (Visser, 2008) . The municipality nevertheless played an increasingly important role in the initiative, through financial investment, risk underwriting and use of its powers to support development of heat markets which the Warmtebedrijf would supply. Notably the municipality granted concessions to heat distribution companies in identified zones, and adopted building control regulations supporting connection of new and refurbished buildings to the heat network.
At this stage, the DH business case (PVW, 2005) was the product of a partnership between municipality, businesses, the harbour industry association and three energy utilities; these are transnational E.ON; Nuon, a former Dutch municipal enterprise in which Swedish state-owned Vattenfall has a controlling share, and Eneco, owned by a consortium of Dutch municipalities. Two setbacks had a significant impact. The initial business plan used heat recovery from a harbour oil refinery, but the refinery operator withdrew during the engineering design period amid contested accounts as to whether political or technical factors lay behind escalating estimates of the cost of extracting surplus heat from the refinery. Refinery withdrawal undermined system economics, at a point when competitive tendering had already resulted in operating concessions to Nuon and Eneco for new heat distribution networks. Political divisions arose within the municipality over the differential risks of uncertain future costs versus loss of sunk investment. A new business model, developed over two years, resulted in considerable scaling up and reorganisation of roles. E.ON presented a new set of financial models for the initiative, based on a more sophisticated model of heat dispatch, and including connection of an existing heat distribution network which E.ON supplied. The original plan for public ownership and operation evolved into a disaggregated structure, designed to secure the joint venture with E.ON and to govern commercial arrangements for heat supply to E.ON's existing networks. A publicly owned company proceeded to build the transmission network, but operation is managed as a joint venture with E.ON. Whereas the original proposal combined heat from the refinery with a waste incinerator, the new proposal rested solely on the latter.
However, in 2009 when the incinerator was closed in response to national overcapacity. A second incinerator was identified as replacement, but the greater distance from heat demand increased costs. The financial powers of the municipality were crucial; its equity investment increased from €9m to €38m, and the commercial loans it underwrites increased from €58m to €150m (Warmtebedrijf, 2010) . The project received a €27m grant from central government, calculated as equivalent to the avoided social costs of CO2 and NOx emissions.
Several parallels between Rotterdam and Bergen are clear. In both cases the relationships between firms and regulators and regional business networks motivated and sustained coordination to explore DH as a solution to an environmental problem.
The rising salience of climate politics stimulated direct municipal government engagement in the initiative. In contrast with Bergen, where the state licensed the heat network operator, the involvement of Rotterdam municipality appeared crucial in establishing the framework for user connection, and in ensuring financial stability.
Survival of the initiative, following withdrawal of the refinery, depended on extended collaboration, particularly between E.ON and the municipality. sector customers. The local authority relied on Utilicom's access to loan and equity finance for the majority of investment, as well as its experience of network development, operation and retail supply. It thus externalised the project risk, but ceded direct control over future development. BDEC has established three CHP/DH schemes (total CHP capacity 7.5MW e ). In the first scheme BCC owns or has a significant ownership stake in most of the heat subscribers (council offices, convention centre, sports arena and a leisure and retail development area). Additional subscribers include a hotel built by BCC, but operated by an international company, and the local repertory theatre. The scheme was subsequently expanded to the city's new public library and two BCC multi-storey housing blocks, the latter relying on further UK government grant finance. The second and third schemes supply a university, a children's hospital, magistrates court and BCC buildings, and are close to a regeneration area which may provide future subscribers.
WOKING: environmental politics, executive leadership and local enterprise.
Local environmental politics and chief executive commitment made Woking borough council (WBC) an early innovator in energy saving, commencing in 1992 with a £250,000 revolving fund for reducing energy use in council buildings. Success of the programme on environmental and financial criteria strengthened political legitimacy and the council sought to scale up to larger DH projects. WBC developed a business model combining local authority participation with commercial finance and expertise.
Its first attempted partnership with a regional electricity company (London Electricity) in 1998 was abandoned when the latter was bought by a transnational utility. In 1999 WBC established a joint venture, Thameswey Energy Limited (TEL), with a Danish company, with CHP and DH developments again supported by CEP grants. Of the remaining finance, 80% was commercial debt, and WBC took a 19% equity stake (i.e. WBC contributed 3.8% of the non-grant finance).
TEL developed a number of small systems for WBC services such as sheltered housing. The most significant initiative, Woking Central (CHP capacity 1.4MW e ), is anchored by heat loads from council buildings and has been extended to several private sector residential and commercial subscribers. The scheme was sized to serve a county council housing development, which was subsequently cancelled, creating financial problems due to over-sizing of the energy centre. TEL has also developed a CHP/DH scheme in Milton Keynes (about 100km away) serving new development on land held by a state owned regeneration agency, which supports DH connection through planning requirements.
WBC's ambitions for DH have been scaled back following two significant events. 
Discussion and Conclusions
The case study comparison suggests that, despite the considerable socio-technical challenges of all of these district energy projects, multi-organisation collaboration to establish larger scale heat networks proved more feasible in the Netherlands and Norway than in the UK. Case study comparisons indicated two important aspects of political and economic institutions which underpinned progress in European cases, and which were largely absent in the UK: first state regulation to align business interests around utilisation of surplus heat; and second coordination mechanisms by which national and/or local governments can establish heat markets through areabased concessions which sustain business confidence in opportunities for expansion, while protecting user interests in reliable service standards and fair prices. These 
